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CASE NOTES
of law will in all instances be sufficient grounds for modification of a
decree based on prior law. Rather it need only be decided that such will
be the Court's holding when the subsequent law specifically changes the
public right which was the protected interest in the prior decree. Conse-
quently the vitality of prior cases which rested in large part upon the rea-
soning of Degenhart v. Hartford' 3 should not be considered diminished by
the holding in this decision. In fact it may be that those cases which appear
to espouse a contradictory rule of law can be distinguished and thereby
reconciled with Degenhart by applying the reasoning of the Court in the
instant case."
EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, III
Taxation—Deductions for Interest.—Knetsch v. United States. 1 —
In 1953 petitioner purchased a 30 year annuity bond in the face amount of
$4,000,000, earning interest at 2 .1/2% annually. He made a small down
payment and for the balance signed nonrecourse notes bearing 3%% interest,
with the annuity pledged as the sole security. At the beginning of the year,
after making advance interest payments on the notes, petitioner was allowed
to borrow further sums, to the extent of the difference between the cash
value of the annuity bond at the end of that year and the total amount of his
indebtedness. Such loans were made at 3%.% interest in 1953 and 1954.
For these years petitioner claimed a deduction, under Section 23 of the
1939 Code, for interest paid, both on the principal notes and the additional
loans.2
13 Degenhart v. Hartford, supra note 9. (Funeral home located in an exclusively
residential area was decreed an unlawful nuisance. Subsequent zoning change made
funeral homes permissable in residential areas. Court, however, held that a broad
change of law was nat sufficient to show that the funeral home was not a nuisance.)
And see cases cited supra note 9.
14 See cases cited supra note 8.
1 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
2 In effect the taxpayer has purchased a tax deduction at a cost to him of only a





1953 Initial Payment 4,000
1953 Prepaid Interest on Annuity 140,000 140,000	 --
1953 Prepaid Interest on Cash Loan 3,465 3,465
1954 Prepaid Interest on Total Debt 143,465 143,465
1954 Prepaid Interest on Cash Loan 3,640 3,640
Gross Expenditures 294,570
Less:	 Receipts
1953 Cash Loan 99,000
1943 Cash Loan 104,000 203,000
Net Expenditure 91,570
Total Claimed Deductions 290,570
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The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and
determined a deficiency for each year. The petitioner paid the deficiencies
and brought an action for refund in the District Court. A judgment for the
government was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Because of a suggested
conflict with a Fifth Circuit decisions the Supreme Court granted certiorari,'
and affirmed. HELD: The amounts paid by petitioner were not interest on
indebtedness within the meaning of Section 23 of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code (now Section 163 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code).
The law in effect at the time of these transactions, the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code, disallowed deductions for interest on indebtedness incurred
or continued to purchase single premium life insurance or endowment
policies.5
 With the enactment of the 1954 Code, which extended this
disallowance to single premium annuities, the deduction claimed in the
principal case was expressly denied. 6 Nonetheless, the issue presented in
the principal case, because it is subsumed by the more general problem
dealing with alleged interest payments on all types of indebtedness, merits
attention. The general problem, simply stated, is whether the claimed
deduction is "interest on indebtedness" within the meaning of Section 23
of the 1939 Code, 7 or Section 163 of the 1954 Code.s
Generally, tax statutes are drafted broadly, since Congress cannot
anticipate all of the problems that may arise. Frequently, individuals, in
an attempt to gain for themselves tax benefits, will go to great lengths to
8 United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958).
4 361 U.S. 958 (1960).
5 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 24:
(a) General Rule . 	 In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be
allowed in respect of .
(6) any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to
purchase a single premium life insurance or endowment contract. For the
purpose of this paragraph, if substantially all the premiums on an insurance
contract are paid within a period of four years from which such contract
is purchased such contract shall be considered a single premium contract.
6 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, I 264:
(a) General Rule . . . No deduction shall be allowed for ..
(2) any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to
purchase or carry a single premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity
contract. Paragraph (2) shall apply in respect of annuity contracts only as
to contracts purchased after March 1, 1954.
(b) Contracts Treated as Single Premium Contracts . . . For the purposes of (a)
(2), a contract shall be treated as a single premium contract . .
(1) if substantially all the premiums on the contract are paid within a
period of four years from date of contract, or (2) if amount is deposited
after March 1, 1954, with the insurer for payment of a substantial num-
ber of further premiums on the contract.
7 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 23:
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: . • .
(b) all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness....
8 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 163:
(a) General Rule ... There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.
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create allowable deductions. When this happens it is for the courts to
decide between the letter and the spirit of the law. In facing this problem of
tax statute interpretation the court will disregard the motives of the tax-
payer, examining only the nature and results of the transaction. In Gregory
v. Helvering° Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote: "the legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes .. . cannot be
doubted. . . . But the question is, whether what was done, aside from the
tax motives, was the thing that the statute intended." In viewing a specific
transaction to determine "if what was done .. . was the thing the statute
intended," the court will ascribe to the words of the statute their ordinary
and every day meaning. In Deputy v. Du Ponti.° Mr. Justice Douglas
recognized as the everyday meaning of "interest on indebtedness," the
amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money.
In the business world "interest on indebtedness" means compensation for
the use of or forbearance of money. It is assumed that Congress has used
the words in this sense.
The application of the Gregory rule, as expanded by the Du Pont case,
may be seen in the following example: Suppose a taxpayer were to execute
and deliver to his wife a promissory note, payable on demand, with interest
at 4%. The husband pays interest to his wife annually and claims deduc-
tions against gross income. He makes no principal payments and gives
no security for the note. The taxpayer would not be entitled to a deduction
for interest arising out of this transaction, because the entire transaction
lacks economic substance." The best expression of this reasoning is to
be found in the dissenting opinion of judge Learned Hand in Gilbert v.
Commissioner: 12 "If, however, the taxpayer enters into a transaction that
does not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax,
the law will disregard it; for we cannot suppose that it was part of the
purpose of the act to provide an escape from the liabilities it sought to
impose."
The principal case fails to meet the test of the Gregory rule. The
petitioner is paying "interest" on notes, the proceeds of which were paid
to the lender for the purchase of the right to receive income 30 years hence,
if the notes have been paid. Should the debt not be paid, the proceeds of
the annuity will be retained by the lender to satisfy the debt, and petitioner
will receive nothing. The notes have no maturity date. No payment on
the principal was made, nor was there any indication that the parties ever
intended payment to be made. Therefore, it seems obvious that payments
by petitioner were not compensation for the use or forbearance of money.
The "thing" that petitioner has done was not the "thing which the statute
intended."
The rule of the Gregory case is the law today. As an aid in applying
239 U.S. 465, 469 (193.5).
10 308 U.S. 488, 497 (1940).
11 United States v. Virgin, 230 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1950).
12 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957).
437
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
this rule, some courts have set out certain guideposts, understanding of
which is invaluable to taxpayers. In United States v. Virginia the court
stated that if the repayment of a note is so uncertain as to maturity, or if it
is so risky, that it is more an advance of venture capital than a loan, there
is no indebtedness within the meaning of the statute. The court in Deputy
v. DuPonti 4
 held that if the transaction imposes no real liability on any
one then interest arising from it is not deductible. In the principal case it
might seem that the majority of the court is establishing a new guidepost.
In their analysis of the case: "It is patent that there was nothing of
substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction, beyond a tax
deduction. What he was ostensibly 'lent' back was in reality only the
rebate of a substantial part of the so called 'interest' payments. . . .
There may well be single premium annuity arrangements . . . which create
an 'indebtedness' for the purpose . . . of the code. But this one is a
sham.'" 5 It is, possibly, with this reasoning that the dissenting Justices"
find their difficulty. The dissent follows the reasoning of Judge Moore in
his dissent in Diggs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 17
 His argument
proceeds something like this: The rationale of the majority of the court
is based upon the assumption that since no money was advanced to the
taxpayer by the insurance company, payments that he made could not be
interest on indebtedness. But in our modern commercial system money is not
always advanced in the sense of delivery. A broker may purchase securities
for a customer and make a loan of the purchase price with the securities
as collateral. The customer usually sees neither the securities nor the
money, yet this is a real transaction, clearly not a sham. The relationship
between the broker and his customer is the same as that existing between
the insurance company and the petitioner.
It is submitted that the analogy drawn disregards a number of im-
portant considerations. In the hypothetical case presented, the customer has
changed his financial interests as a result of the transaction. He stands to
make a profit, or suffer a loss, depending upon conditions in the security
market. Also, it is to be noted that there is actual liability on the customer
as a result of the transaction. The parties anticipate that the purchase
price of the securities will be paid. If payment is not made, and the
collateral is sold, the customer remains personally liable for any deficiency.
13 Supra note II. Taxpayer borrowed money from his wife at 8% interest, the
loan to be repaid only if the family financial position was such that in taxpayer's opinion
no hardship would accrue.
14 308 U.S. 488 (1940). The taxpayer borrowed shares of stock to cover short sales
made for the purpose of passing ownership of the corporation to management, under a
contract which obliged him to pay dividends received to the lender as well as the lender's
income tax on the dividends. Such payments were not allowable interest deductions.
15 Supra note 1, at 135.
16 Justices Douglas, Whittaker and Stewart dissented.
17 281 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1960). Taxpayer purchased an annuity, borrowed from
a bank to prepay the premiums, and then borrowed the cash surrender value from the
insurer to pay the bank. No deductions were allowed for interest paid.
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Clearly, none of these elements of economic substance are to be found in the
principal case.
The alarm of the minority, generated by the majority's designation of
the "sham test" was unnecessary, for it is doubtful that a new "guidepost"
was actually being created. Before the court can characterize any transac-
tion as a sham, the individual components of the arrangement must be
separately examined. They must be measured against the already existing
guideposts of personal liability, definitions of maturity, and substantial
economic substance. It is only when the separate parts fail to meet the
mark that the whole is designated a "sham" and interest incident to the
transaction is disallowed as a deduction from gross income.
ANDREW C. SCHULTZ
Taxation—Depreciation Deduction—Useful Life—Salvage Value.—
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States; Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Evans.'—In each of these companion cases the Court applied Section
23(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to establish the correct deprecia-
tion equation2 for computing the depreciation allowance in given tax years in
respect to automobiles employed in rental and complementary uses. In the
Massey case taxpayer owned an automobile agency which leased out new
model cars and employed current models for company use. Using the
straight-line method in computing his yearly depreciation allowance for the
cars, taxpayer claimed a useful life of 4 years and a salvage value of zero.
These cars would be resold within 15 ,months and if the resale price was
greater than the remaining undepreciated cost, taxpayer would claim a*
capital gain. In the Evans case, taxpayer computed depreciation with respect
to the automobiles rented to a U-Drive agency on the same basis as did
taxpayer Massey. In both cases the Commissioner of Internal Revenue took
issue with the depreciation allowances on the theory that the useful life of
the automobiles should equal their useful life in the taxpayer's business
rather than their physical life, and that upon disposition the salvage value
should equal their resale value rather than their junk value. Taxpayer
Massey succeeded in his claim for a tax refund in the United States District
Court,3 but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 4 The Commissioner's ruling that taxpayer Evans had a tax defi-
ciency was supported by the Tax Court, 5 but the decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ('
The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision HELD: The business taxpayer
364 U.S. 92 (1960).
(Total cost) — (Salvage value)2 	
 — Yearly depreciation allowance.(Years of estimated life)
3 156 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
4 264 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1959).
5 16 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 639 (1957).
6 264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959).
439
